In this paper we apply a coalitional stability analysis to a Cobb-Douglas economy with multilateral environmental externalities. We find that the sequential core of the economy can be unique, empty or nonempty depending on the intensity of agents' preferences on private and public goods.
Introduction
In this paper we apply the concept of sequential core (introduced by Currarini and Marini, 2003) to an economy with negative environmental externalities. Such approach assumes that, when the members of a coalition deviate from the grand coalition they possess a first-mover advantage in selecting their joint strategy profile. Moreover, it is assumed that outside players respond to any deviating coalition by optimally reacting as singletons. We test this coalitional approach on a specific Cobb-Douglas economy with negative multilateral externalities (e.g., pollutants emissions) originated as side-effect of the production activity. Similar types of economies were studied, among others, by Maler (1992) and Chander-Tulkens (1997) . In Maler (1992) , it is shown that the concept of α-core (Aumann, 1959) coincides with the set of Pareto-optima of the economy.
Chander-Tulkens (1997) prove that the γ-core is nonempty. In what follows we show that the sequential core of the economy (here denoted λ-core) can be, respectively, unique, nonempty or empty depending on the intensity of agents' preferences on private and public goods.
An Economy with Environmental Externalities
We consider an economy with finite set of agents 
where s denotes the size of coalition S.
Main Results
In this Section we prove that the λ-core of the game G can be characterized for Proof. We show that no allocation but the equal split (giving to each player the payoff
) belongs to the λ-core. By (1) we obtain
This directly implies that no allocation other than the equal split belongs to the λ-core. To show that the equal split belongs to the λ-core, it suffices to show that
for all coalitions S with s > 1. Using (1) we obtain
which, using again the fact that d = bγ reduces to 
Proof.
We proceed with a numerical simulation. We need to show that whenever a > bγ the difference
is strictly positive for every s.
We first consider the case s = 1. 
